In the paper [Quantum Inf. Process. 14, 4237-4244 (2015)], Qin and Dai proposed a proactive quantum secret sharing scheme. We study the security of the proposed scheme and find that it is not secure. In the distribution phase of the proposed scheme, two dishonest participants may collaborate to eavesdrop the secret of the dealer without introducing any error. Incidentally, a possible improvement of the distribution phase is given.
Introduction
As we all know, quantum secret sharing (QSS) is a counterpart of classical secret sharing in quantum world. In QSS, a secret will be split into several pieces by a dealer, and each participant holds a piece, and no subset of participants is sufficient to extract the secret, but the entire set is. Note that not all of the participants in QSS are credible, moreover, a dishonest participant has more power to attack a QSS scheme than a outside eavesdropper. Therefore, we should pay more attention to the attack of dishonest participant(s) when analyzing the security. Recently, by using Bell states and unitary operations, Qin and Dai [1] proposed a proactive QSS scheme, which has the three phases: the distribution phase, the updating phase and the recovery phase. The Qin-Dai QSS scheme [1] is interesting because all participants in it can periodically update their key shares, meanwhile, the secret of the dealer is changeless. However, it is somewhat a pity that the Qin-Dai QSS scheme has a drawback of security. That is, in the distribution phase of the scheme, the two dishonest participants (the first participant and the last participant) may collaborate to eavesdrop the secret of the dealer without being detected.
Distribution phase in the Qin-Dai QSS scheme
Before describing our attack strategy, let us review the distribution phase in the Qin-Dai QSS scheme as follows: (1) Alice generates a Einstein-Podolsky-Rose (EPR) pair sequence, which is denoted with {|Ψ x 1 ,y 1 , |Ψ x 2 ,y 2 , ..., |Ψ xm,ym } (here, x i , y i ∈ {0, 1}). Each EPR pair is randomly in one of the four Bell states:
(2) Alice takes the first particle and the second particle from each EPR pair to form 
Insecurity of the Qin-Dai QSS scheme
In this section, we start to describe our attack strategy in detail. By the way, this attack strategy will be implemented by the first participant (Bob 1 ) and the last participant (Bob n ). In other words, Bob 1 and Bob n can obtain Alice's secret without help of the other participants by this attack strategy. This attack strategy is described as follows:
In advance, Bob 1 prepares a sequence composed of m EPR pairs, in which each pair is in |ψ ab = sequence including decoy particles to Alice. Since that Alice checks the security of the received sequence transmission only depends on Bob n 's inserting decoy particles, she can not detect the eavesdropping of Bob 1 and Bob n . From
Step (10), we see that Alice's secret is shown with (
According to the above analysis, we see there is a security loophole in the distribution phase of the Qin-Dai QSS scheme, that is, Alice's secret can not be safely shared among all the participants. Next, we will give an improvement for the distribution phase of the Qin-Dai QSS scheme. In order to reserve the character of the distribution phase, we will only change the method that Alice checks the security of the participant publishes the operations performed on the y particles in the same positions. Note that, the orders that they publish the operations are random. After these, Alice uses a correct measuring basis to measure the corresponding y particles. By comparing the deductive outcomes with the measuring outcomes, she can judge whether the whole quantum channel is secure.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have proposed a attack strategy on the Qin-Dai QSS scheme, and shown that, in the distribution phase of the scheme, Bob 1 and Bob n can collaborate to eavesdrop Alice's secret without introducing any error. In other words, we have proved that the Qin-Dai QSS scheme is not secure. We see
